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Bv MuRRAY L. WEIDENBAUM 
A Statement to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
Washington, D.C., September 20, 1978 
ANOTHER APPROACH TO REGULATORY REFORM 
By Murray L. Weidenbaum 
A Statement to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
Washington, D.C., September 20, 1978 
I would like to present a different approach to regulatory reform, 
one that involves the Congress more than the bureaucracy. At the outset, 
it is helpful to emphasize the compelling case for reforming government 
regulation: 
1. The regulatory apparatus is extremely cumbersome and costly. To 
substantiate that, I submit for the record my formal statement and the 
new Directory of Federal Regulation just prepared by our Center for the 
Study of American Business at Washington University. 
2. Government regulation generates many adverse side effects which 
interfere with the attainment of other important national objectives. 
These undesirable impacts of regulation include higher inflation, more 
unemployment, lower productivity, reduced capital formation, and a slow-
down in technological innovation. 
3. But the primary objection to regulation is that, by and large, it 
is not working. It is not a question of begrudging a 11 few 11 more billion 
dollars for job safety, consumer health, etc. The fact is that the 
typical regulatory program is not effective in reaching these worthy 
objectives. 
The answer surely is not to redouble the existing regulatory effort. 
That only resembles the hangover remedy that consists of the hair of the 
Note: Mr. Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for the Study of American 
Business at Washington University in St. Louis and adjunct scholar at the 
American Enterprise Institute. 
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dog that bit you. Nor is the main answer the obvious one of berating 
the bureaucracy. To be sure, much nonsense emanates from the regulatory 
agencies. I have tried to do mY share to expose and thus eliminate silly 
regulations. 
But the fundamental source of the problem is statutory. Every regu-
lation is promulgated under the authority of a statute passed by the 
Congress. Every regulator is paid out of an appropriation passed by 
the Congress. As a general matter, Congress has set up too many regulatory 
agencies, passed too many regulatory laws, set up too many unrealistic 
regulatory objectives, and appropriated too much money to carry on too 
much regulation. Thus, the ultimate need is for the Congress to come 
to realize that the government cannot regulate everything. 
We must understand why the Congress has set up this vast regulatory 
apparatus. Surely, the intent was not to harass business or to burden 
the consumer. Rather, the Congress was reacting to the pressures from 
a variety of interest groups that have been urging more and more regula-
tion, many of them operating under the banner of the Public Interest. 
The public, the media, and government decision makers all need to 
realize that the limited viewpoints of these so-called public interest 
groups prevent them from effectively representing the totality of the 
public interest. The problem is their attitude that they represent the 
public interest. One of the keys to their power is the myth of their 
powerlessness. 
In the public arena, they possess great power. Large segments of 
the media, as well as many other institutions, defer to the representatives 
of the so-called Public Interest Groups because they are viewed automatically 
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as the underdog. This simpleminded attitude often results in the 
people who disagree with them being portrayed as the "heavies." Just 
because I may disagree with Ralph Nader on a specific issue should not 
inevitably be taken as my representing some special interest opposed to 
the public welfare. It may just happen that on occasion Ralph is wrong. 
A little humility would go a long way in broadening the intellectual 
horizons of many of the so-called Public Interest Groups. It is no 
simple task to identify the public interest in any specific issue of 
public policy. As a past participant in government policy-making, it 
is apparent to me that good policy consists of properly balancing and 
reconciling a variety of bona fide interests. This is far more difficult 
than merely choosing in a simple-minded fashion between 11 public" or 
"consumer" interests (which are presumably good and to be endorsed) and 
11 Special" interests, which are presumably evil and to be opposed. 
What can be done? There are no simple approaches. It surely is not 
a question of being for or against regulation of business. A substantial 
degree of governmental intervention is to be expected in a complex, modern 
society. The need, rather, is to identify those sensible changes that can 
be made in the regulatory process so as to achieve the desired social 
goals (less pollution, fewer product hazards, etc.) with minimum adverse 
impacts on other important goals (more jobs, less inflation, etc.). The 
serious question is whether, in view of the many goals of our society, 
government regulation in a particular instance is doing more harm than good. 
1. An economic impact statement should be required prior to issuing 
each new regulation. The notion that policymakers should carefully con-
sider the costs and other adverse effects of their actions as well as 
the benefits is neither new nor revolutionary. The Ford Administration 
did institute some form of economic impact statements for new regulations. 
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President Carter has recently made some changes in the procedures. 
Unfortunately, neither the Ford nor the Carter approaches are up to the 
task. 
Merely requiring a reluctant agency to perform benefit/cost analyses 
is not adequate. The key action needed is for Congress to pass a law 
limiting regulations to those instances where the total benefits to 
society exceed the costs. Government regulation should be carried to 
the point where the costs equal the benefits, and no further. Overregula-
tion -- which is regulation for which the costs exceed the benefits --
should be avoided. The failure to take those costs into account has re-
sulted in the problem of overregulation that faces the United States today. 
The ~equirement for an economic impact statement would be well met 
by the provisions of S.2011, the proposed Regulatory Reduction and Control 
Act of 1978. This proposed law contains many important and useful pro-
visions, notably requiring the head of each regulatory agency to send to 
the Congress a comprehensive economic analysis of a proposed rule before 
it takes effect. Under S.2011 the required economic impact analysis must 
cover the costs and benefits to consumers, wage earners, businesses, and 
federal, state and local governments. A paperwork impact analysis is 
also required. It would be helpful if S.2011 required the regulatory 
agency to demonstrate that the benefits exceeded the costs before it 
could promulgate any new rule. 
2. All existing government regulatory activities should be subject 
to a sunset mechanism. Each regulatory agency should be reviewed by the 
Congress on a strict timetable to determine whether it is worthwhile to 
continue it in light of changing circumstances. Many government programs, 
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prove this. A more satisfying answer to improving the effectiveness of 
government regulation of private activities requires a basic change in 
the approach to regulation, and one not limited to the job safety program. 
Indeed, I use that program merely as an illustration. If the objective of 
public policy is to reduce accidents, then public policy should focus 
directly on the reduction of accidents themselves. 
Rather than issuing citations to employers who fail to fill forms out 
correctly or who do not post the right notices, emphasis should be placed 
on the regulation of employers with high and rising accident rates. But 
the government should not be much concerned with how a company achieves 
a safer working environment. Some companies may find it more efficient 
to change work rules, others to buy new equipment, and still others to 
retrain workers. The making of this choice is precisely the kind of 
operational business decision making that government is not good at and 
should avoid. 
5. Finally, the role and importance of individual decision mak~ng 
should not be ignored. We all need to understand that the massive extent 
of federal intervention in the economy -- high levels of taxation, 
expenditures, and regulation -- makes it difficult for the private sector 
to perform its basic functions. The major contribution Congress could 
make is to reduce the burdens imposed by big government. 
